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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE USSR



NIE-60

Published 30 April 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE USSR

NIE-60

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. [All members of] the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 14 April 1952.

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CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE USSR

THE PROBLEM

To describe the Soviet civil defense program and to estimate its capabilities.*

ESTIMATE

1. *Summary.* The USSR has a large, complex, and well-organized civil defense system, which is integrated into the over-all Soviet Anti-Air Defense system (PVO). This system is based on the extensive civil defense structure which the USSR maintained during World War II. It is probable that civil defense organizations and auxiliaries designed to meet wartime emergencies exist in most cities and rayons,** with the most intensive preparations in large cities and at more important industrial installations. The civil defense system is gradually being brought to an increased state of readiness and appears capable of rapid expansion in event of emergency. However, there is no evidence of any preparations for early hostilities.

2. *Background.* Civil defense training in the USSR goes back as far as 1927, when the first mass military auxiliary (OSOAVIAKhIM) was organized, with mass civil defense training as one of its most important functions. The totalitarian structure and elaborate control mechanisms of the USSR have greatly facilitated the Soviet civil defense task. During World War II the Soviet civil defense organizations, in which nearly all civilians

were compelled to participate, played a large and diverse role. Besides their activities in areas under air attack, civil defense units constructed their own ground defenses and defense lines for the Red Army, and they participated in the reconstruction of bombed and devastated areas. The wartime civil defense organization and program has never been discontinued, and the structure of the present civil defense system appears unchanged in essentials since World War II.

3. However, for a time after the war the Soviet population was evidently apathetic toward civil defense activities, and these activities declined. The Soviet government has attempted to overcome this apathy by means of propaganda rather than by the compulsion resorted to during the war. Although all persons of 16 to 60 years of age are subject under existing decree to participation in the civil defense program, the government to date has chosen to keep the program on a "voluntary" basis ("voluntary" in the Soviet sense doubtless including indirect pressures). Since 1948 internal propaganda, disseminated through Communist party organs, trade unions, the Young Communist League, and military auxiliaries, as well as by the press and radio, has been increasingly stressing the need for civil defense training of the entire population.

4. *The Present Civil Defense System.* (See Appendix A.) The existing Soviet civil defense program stresses planning and training for the rapid and effective mobilization of all available resources to deal with wartime emer-

* The term "civil defense" as used in this study includes only those passive defense activities designed to: (a) minimize the immediate effects upon a civilian population that would be caused through a sudden attack; (b) deal with the immediate emergency conditions created by any such attack; and (c) effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities.

** A *rayon* is an administrative subdivision of an *oblast*, which is a subdivision of a Union Republic.

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gencies in target areas. While the civil defense program receives supervision, support, and financial assistance from the central government, it appears to be based upon a workable balance between this centralized control and maximum local initiative in the utilization of civilian resources and manpower. The entire program is based upon integration into the civil defense system of agencies, groups, and enterprises whose primary functions are other than civil defense but which would assume civil defense operational roles in event of war.

5. The core of the Soviet civil defense program, and the mechanism through which its various elements are centrally coordinated and supervised, is the MPVO (Local Anti-Air Defense) system, which is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A section of the MVD Ministry in Moscow, the Main Administration of Local Anti-Air Defense (GUM-PVO), is responsible for central supervision of MPVO activities throughout the USSR. Under it is an MPVO corps, composed of MVD personnel professionally qualified in civil defense duties. The MPVO corps functions as a command and staff organization which undertakes civil defense planning and supervises and coordinates the training and activities of the various existing agencies and groups which have civil defense roles. The latter provide, on a part-time basis, the vast bulk of the local MPVO personnel. MPVO activities generally are organized in staffs or units composed of MVD and local civilian authorities at administrative levels descending from all-union, to union-republic, oblast, city or rayon, down to individual plants, institutions, and even dwellings. (See chart on page 6.)

6. The basic civil defense unit is the city or rayon MPVO, which may plan for and supervise such services as camouflage, firefighting, medical-sanitation, veterinary, damage restoration, anti-chemical defense, communications and reporting, security and public order, transportation, shelter, and evacuation. These services are generally performed by such existing agencies as the local police and firefighting forces, local health and sanitation

facilities, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and others. The larger city or rayon MPVO units have under them sector units with similar organization, while the smallest MPVO unit is the "self-defense group," which is formed within apartments, small enterprises, schools, etc., on the basis of approximately one per 100 persons. There were reportedly in 1948 some 1,060,000 local civil defense units of all types. These units represent cadres which can be expanded or around which new sub-units can be formed in event of national emergency, in accordance with existing predetermined plans.

7. Special emphasis is apparently placed on providing local MPVO organizations at important factories and other targets such as railroads. These units have crews which perform services similar to the services of the city MPVO's. Most industrial or economic ministries have special sections which, among other things, are apparently responsible for seeing to it that plants under their jurisdiction carry out the necessary civil defense preparations.

8. Although the MPVO organization is under the MVD, the military Anti-Air Defense system (PVO) also has an over-all coordinating role involving civil as well as military defense, especially in wartime situations. The PVO headquarters, a separate top level component of the War Ministry, is ultimately responsible for the entire Soviet air defense system, and as such probably monitors passive air defense measures to insure coordination of over-all defense plans. When a local area or city is under attack, the MPVO organization comes under the operational control of the PVO commander in that area, if such an officer has been designated.

9. *Civil Defense Training.* (See Appendix B.) The Soviet civil defense program encompasses both specialized training of MPVO personnel and mass training of large population groups through various mass organizations. With the aid of such other agencies as the Ministry of Health and the armed forces, the MPVO organization sets up standards for the training of the civilian population. Actual training programs are conducted by the MPVO service itself and by the existing local agencies

whose civil defense activities the MPVO supervises.

10. In addition, mass training of the population in basic civil defense measures is undertaken as part of their broader functions by the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF), which is the chief Soviet military auxiliary society, and by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, sports societies, and other similar groups. The civil defense program is widely advertised through the Soviet propaganda machinery and given unity and purpose through the agitation and discipline of the Communist Party and its youth organizations.

11. The scope of mass civil defense training is indicated by evidence that an estimated 16,000,000 people participate in the activities of DOSAAF, and about 15,000,000 in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, while perhaps 20,000,000 have been trained in the MPVO system itself. These figures undoubtedly include considerable overlapping since many persons probably belong to more than one group. Personnel who are not officially part of the above groups, but who have had some appropriate military or medical training, must also be considered as part of the civil defense potential. These include many people trained during World War II. The Soviet civil defense potential is much greater in terms both of trained personnel and of mass popular education than it was at the beginning of World War II. Moreover, as the present training programs steadily add to the reserve of trained personnel, this potential will gradually increase.

12. The MPVO Main Administration (GUMPVO) has emphasized the necessity of maintaining MPVO in a state of readiness, stressing the use of up-to-date techniques. Civil defense conferences called by GUMPVO have reviewed wartime experiences and their application to civil defense activities. These matters have also been treated extensively in professional publications. Moreover, as a result of wartime experience, the MPVO system has reportedly adopted new equipment and techniques. One is a "mobile command post" vehicle with radio equipment, a switchboard

which can be connected with the local telephone system, and amplifiers from which operations can be directed at the scene of the disaster. Another MPVO development is provision for technical emergency vehicles, having simple equipment for rescue and maintenance work, and serving as moveable blacked-out workshops. Portable lighting systems apparently have also been developed specifically for civil defense purposes. However, the extent to which such equipment is available in quantity is not known.

13. *Defense against Special Weapons Attacks.* (See Appendix C.) Although it is not clear from available evidence that the USSR is making specific preparations for civil defense against atomic weapons, the USSR is probably preparing against such attacks in its broader civil defense measures. In any event, known Soviet internal propaganda has consistently minimized the effects of atomic attacks, and there is apparently little popular anxiety over the consequences of atomic bombing. One motive for such minimizing might be to reduce the element of panic immediately preceding or during atomic attacks on the USSR.

14. The USSR has long placed great emphasis on defense against chemical attack in its civil defense program. These measures, particularly the medical and decontamination facilities, are also adaptable to some aspects of defense against atomic attack and such adaptation may be planned. Existing Soviet facilities for combatting human, plant, and animal diseases also give the USSR a substantial capability for civil defense against biological warfare attack. However, there are no indications that specific anti-BW training is underway. Soviet chemical warfare defense facilities would to some degree be adaptable to supporting BW defense.

15. *Other Civil Defense Activities and Resources.* (See Appendix D.) Soviet civil defense plans provide for the integrated use of resources such as the police, firefighting, public health, communications, transportation, construction, and other agencies under MPVO supervision in event of emergency. The highly developed MGB police services would have ex-

tensive capabilities for maintaining order in event of emergency, while the firefighting system, which is under the MVD, is trained for a major civil defense role. The extensive medical and sanitary facilities of the Ministry of Health are already tied into the MPVO system.

16. Although no elements of the extensive Soviet stockpiling program have been identified as being set aside specifically for civil defense, numerous items which would be useful for this purpose are known to be kept in reserve. There are also unconfirmed reports of a plan for the emergency decentralization of Soviet administration on a regional basis.

17. While present shelter facilities in the USSR consist primarily of those remaining from World War II, there is evidence of provision for shelter facilities in new building in important target areas. Dwelling construction specifications in some areas include provision for shelters, and some installations, such as subways and other tunnels, have apparently been constructed with auxiliary shelter needs in mind. Construction agencies frequently retain "defense specialists" (probably MPVO officers) to monitor construction plans from the point of view of defense needs, including not only possible shelter facilities but also proper siting and dispersal of facilities, and possible alternative emergency uses, for example, the use of schools as emergency barracks or hospitals.

18. We cannot estimate the extent to which these resources would enable the USSR to cope with wartime emergencies, especially atomic attacks.

19. *Soviet Civil Defense Capabilities.* In the light of the above evidence as to the nature and extent of the Soviet civil defense program, we believe that the USSR must already be given a substantial civil defense capability, probably greater than that of any other major country except perhaps the UK. Its present civil defense system appears well-planned and organized, although it may be deficient in

specific preparations against atomic attack. It includes a full-time civil defense staff organization, comprehensive plans for the utilization of other existing agencies and facilities, and an extensive training program. In addition, civil defense needs are apparently being taken into consideration in new construction and urban and regional planning, and perhaps in stockpiling and decentralization programs.

20. The Soviet civil defense program is made less difficult by the existing dispersal of population and industry. Moreover, the elaborate Soviet control mechanisms and the highly regimented character of the population also make control and evacuation in case of air attacks easier. On the other hand, the Soviet civil defense problem is, in some respects, greater than that of most other major countries. The large proportion of wood construction in the USSR creates a serious fire hazard, while, in a civil defense emergency, there would be a serious shortage of transport facilities and of materials.

21. Although the civil defense system appears capable of rapid expansion in event of emergency, there is no evidence of preparations which would indicate an expectation of early hostilities. In the limited areas open to them, Western observers have seen slight evidence of the building of special air raid shelters, air raid drills, posters giving civil defense instructions to the populace or other indications of preparation against air attacks. The "voluntary" nature of the civil defense program also indicates that it is still in a preoperational stage, and has not been given so high a priority as to call for compulsory measures.

22. We believe that the USSR is placing increased emphasis on civil defense activities, along with its other efforts to improve the defenses of the USSR against enemy air attacks. The expanding civil defense program, together with the USSR's increasingly effective air defenses, contributes to a growing Soviet capability for defense against hostile air attack.

APPENDIX "A"

CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. There is abundant evidence that the USSR maintains a large and elaborate civil defense system, which is based on the extensive civil defense structure in use during World War II.* The primary operational roles in this system are assigned to existing agencies, groups, and enterprises at local, regional, and national levels, whose primary functions are other than civil defense. Aside from the existing peacetime resources of these agencies and groups, however, we do not have any adequate information as to the extent to which they have been allocated special civil defense equipment and resources, which would probably be essential to cope with wartime emergencies, especially from atomic attack.

2. The core of the Soviet civil defense program, and the mechanism through which the civil defense activities of the various agencies and groups are centrally controlled and supervised, is the MPVO (Local Anti-Air Defense) system, which is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A section of the MVD headquarters in Moscow, the Main Administration of Local Anti-Air Defense (GUMPVO) is responsible for central supervision of MPVO activities throughout the USSR. GUMPVO was probably organized in 1939 or 1940 to take over from the Red Army the coordination and supervision of local civil air defense. Under it is an MPVO career corps composed of full-time MPVO personnel specially trained in civil defense duties. Such a full-time civil defense corps has evidently existed for at least ten years. The MPVO corps functions as a command and staff organization which undertakes civil defense planning, and supervises and coordinates at all levels the activities and training of the various other existing agencies

* The data on this subject is derived largely from Russian and German World War II documents, which have been extensively confirmed by more recent information from repatriated German POW's, Soviet defectors, Soviet professional journals, training manuals, press releases, and open Soviet literature such as Soviet encyclopedias.

such as local police and firefighting services, local health and sanitation facilities, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, etc. which provide, on a part-time basis, the vast bulk of local MPVO personnel.

3. MPVO activities generally are organized in staffs and units composed of MVD and/or local civilian authorities at administrative levels descending from all-union to union-republic, oblast, city or rayon, and down to individual plants, institutions, and even dwelling units. (See chart on page 6.) Through these MPVO units, voluntary or auxiliary groups of the civilian population can be brought together in a coordinated effort with existing local police and firefighting units, ambulance and rescue units, medical facilities, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Moreover, the peacetime MPVO units themselves represent nuclei which can be expanded or around which new units can be formed in event of war, in accordance with existing predetermined plans.


4. *MPVO Organization of a City or Rayon.* The basic MPVO unit is the city or rayon MPVO.** Local governmental and party organs, economic enterprises, public organizations, and individuals within a city or rayon are brought together for the purposes of civil defense under the local chief of MPVO, usually an MVD officer, and his staff. (See chart on page 9.) The chief and his staff formulate and carry out the plan of action for his city or rayon, finance and direct acquisition of material and technical operations, provide for training of staff and public, and supervise the operation of civil defense forces and facilities of the city or rayon in event of war disasters. For execution of this course of action, the city or rayon MPVO calls upon its supporting services which may vary according to local conditions and the living requirements of a particular city or region. Various MPVO services may be created within a variety of existing organizational structures:

** It is not clear when city-wide MPVO organizations were first formed, but they were mentioned in Soviet documents as early as 1938.

SOVIET ORGANIZATION FOR AIR DEFENCE WITHIN THE USSR

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a. *The Shelter Service* organizes and supervises the registering of cellars or other areas of possible use as air raid shelters. It also plans and constructs shelters, including dug-outs and trenches, and is responsible for providing protection for the population.

b. *The Camouflage Service* provides for blackout precautions, for camouflage with paint or vegetation, and for smoke camouflage. The latter may be used only with the authority of the PVO (Air Defense Force) commander, since it may affect military operations. Camouflage measures are the responsibility of all civilians, with special attention required in each home, enterprise, school, and office.

c. *The Evacuation Service* is responsible for developing a plan for evacuation of people and valuable goods and insuring orderly execution of this plan should it become necessary. It must register all living space which might be used for quartering evacuees.

d. *The Transportation Service* is designed to provide the city or rayon with emergency transportation facilities. This includes keeping transportation personnel informed about traffic routes, adapting equipment for special tasks, organizing and training crews of drivers for civil defense operations, and registering and employing all forms of transportation.

e. *The Service for the Preservation of Order and Security* is built around the regular local police force (MGB militia) augmented by crews of auxiliary organizations, including the Society for Assistance to the Police, which are trained by the police. It has the following basic missions: fighting panic and the spreading of false rumors during enemy air raids, insuring conformance of local population with public laws and civil defense rules, isolating stricken areas, and directing traffic. The highly developed Soviet security services would be of great value in coping with panic in case of heavy air attacks.

f. *The Communication and Reporting Service* of the MPVO of a city or rayon is designed to insure communication facilities required by the commands and staffs of MPVO for relaying orders during an attack and during restoration of damage. It is also responsible for

warning the city or rayon of impending air attack. In this function it cooperates with the warning system of the PVO system. Facilities and personnel employed include local radio facilities and the local telephone network, the chief of which may be designated as the chief of the Communications and Reporting Service. To fulfill its purpose the Service must provide for the restoration and repair of communications in case of damage and for the training of civilian groups for employment as emergency communication crews.

g. *The Anti-Fire Service*. The MPVO firefighting service employs the existing local firefighting unit of the MVD and is headed by the chief of that unit. Its duties include training the populace to fight large fires and to deal with incendiary bombs, developing a fire-signalling system and familiarizing the population of a city with it, providing for fire-prevention measures, and coordinating the employment of firefighting equipment. The Firefighting Service organizes, trains, and equips auxiliary groups (Volunteer Firefighting Brigades) to augment the regular units of the MVD and trains "self-defense groups" in apartments, houses, schools, and other establishments.

h. *Anti-Chemical Defense Service* is primarily designed for decontamination. It trains and directs decontamination crews and trains the local populace in chemical warfare defense. It is also responsible for providing and maintaining decontamination materials and equipment.

i. *The Disaster Restoration Service* has as its primary function to render engineering and technical assistance to insure the continued functioning of the city's or rayon's services and enterprises during and after air raids. It trains restoration brigades from the civilian populace, in all specialties, including the immediate removal of debris so that MPVO crews may have access to stricken areas.

j. *The Medical-Sanitation Service* (MSS MPVO) is staffed primarily by local agencies of the Ministry of Health. It is headed by the director of the city or rayon health depart-

ment or, in rural areas, by the chief of the rural medical district. In fact, the Ministry of Health in Moscow maintains a section devoted to MPVO affairs. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are also assigned roles in the Medical Sanitation Service. The basic purpose of this Service is to render prompt first aid to the victims of an enemy attack. To this end the MSS has emergency authority to administer all civil medical institutions within the area and to adapt them to the needs of MPVO, and to organize stationary and mobile facilities. Provision is made for utilization of first aid points, decontamination points, school buildings, club houses, theaters, and air raid shelters. The MSS may, if necessary, requisition other resources, such as transportation facilities and, with permission of the commanding officer, utilize the medical facilities of local military garrisons.

k. *The Veterinary Service* is organized to render veterinary help for stricken animals, to evacuate them to safe zones, and to ensure procurement of food. On account of their medical training, veterinarians may also administer first aid to humans.

l. *Other Services* than those mentioned may be organized in large cities, for example, for the restoration of roads and bridges, water supply and sewage disposal, electric and gas utilities, trade, food supply, etc.


5. *Smaller Units of MPVO.* Subordinate to the city or rayon MPVO are sectors (*uchastki*), and the MPVO's of special industrial targets. Sector units are divisions of the city or rayon MPVO which can operate semi-independently to meet emergencies within their own area. Below the sector is the smallest MPVO unit, the "self-defense group," which is formed within each dwelling unit, enterprise, or institution which comprises 100 or more people. Where dwellings or enterprises comprise less than 100 people, they are grouped together to form the "self-defense group." These groups have their own MPVO chiefs who are subordinate to the MPVO sector chief, and have six sub-units, similar to the city MPVO services, for observation and communication, decontamination, fire protection, preservation of order, disaster restoration, and

medical aid. The organization of these smaller units is arranged so that duties assigned to their members do not conflict with duties which these members may have with respect to one of the services of the city or rayon MPVO.

6. Factories and other establishments of great economic or defense importance which are likely targets have special MPVO organizations. The MPVO chief at these targets is the director of the enterprise or establishment. Most industrial or economic ministries apparently have their own War Mobilization departments which, among other things, supervise MPVO preparations in the various installations and factories under their control. Operationally, however, the factory MPVO chief is subordinate to the chief of the city or rayon MPVO. The primary mission of a target MPVO is to insure the uninterrupted and proper continuation of the activity under attack. This includes the protection of the labor force, machines, finished products, and raw materials. Crews of the MPVO services mentioned above are organized within the target MPVO unit, including staff, decontamination, disaster restoration, fire protection, medical, veterinary aid (when animals are present), and order and security. MPVO medical brigades are organized from the workers employed at factories and other enterprises. Several reports indicate that factory workers have been receiving training in air raid defense.

7. The Soviet rail network has its own well-organized air raid defense program which ties into the MPVO system. The Railway Administration of the Ministry of Transportation includes an Air Defense Service with air defense inspectors in the operating departments. Provision is made for camouflage and dispersal at stations and other important installations, protection of rolling stock from air attack, and dealing with air raid damage. There is evidence that a railway air defense plan is ready to go into effect upon receipt of coded notification of war. The numerous well-trained and organized railway repair brigades already used in the USSR would be of major civil defense value.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MPVO IN A CITY OR REGION



APPENDIX "B"

CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING

1. There is abundant evidence from Soviet official sources that the Soviet Union recognizes that the effectiveness of civil defense operations in large measure depends upon the amount of training carried on beforehand. The civil defense training program is large and complex, including both intensive specialized training of the MPVO staffs and units, and mass training through various other agencies. Inasmuch as civil defense is part of the total air defense system which is the responsibility of the military Anti-Air Defense system (PVO), PVO officials monitor civil defense training to see that it corresponds to over-all defense plans. Certain categories of MPVO training supervisors are designated by area PVO commanders.

2. Besides the training of members of civil defense units and services within the MPVO system, mass training in the fundamentals of civil defense is carried on by such agencies as the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF) and the Voluntary Societies of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent as part of their broader functions. A system of standards has been developed for the standardization of mass training. In addition, education is provided through propaganda channels, press, radio, and publications.

3. The rapidity with which civil defense groups can be organized under pressure and with systematic propaganda is illustrated by the experience in Moscow early in World War II. On 1 June 1941 there were 1,680 self-defense groups with 40,000 participants, while on 22 July there were 5,463 groups with 120,000 participants. During the course of the war, all people in some measure took part in MPVO activities. Total participation was achieved through compulsion, as provided by the decree of 2 July 1941 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The decree required the participation of all men between the ages of 16 and 60 and women between the ages of 18 to 50 inclusive, except invalids, mothers of young

children, and pregnant women. Training of laborers and office workers was to take place at their respective places of work, training of students at their schools, and training of other civilians at their places of residence.

4. Although the decree under which wartime civil defense mobilization was accomplished is still in effect, it apparently has not been used during the postwar period. Civil defense activities declined considerably after the war. The Soviet government is apparently attempting to overcome postwar apathy by propaganda and indirect pressure rather than by the methods of compulsion used during the war.

5. *MPVO Staff and Unit Training.* The Soviet civil defense training program puts special stress on the training of MPVO command staffs, on the premise that the successful training of MPVO personnel and the organizations and agencies they supervise depends to a large extent upon the preparation of the staff echelon. Consequently, the training of MPVO officer personnel occupies an important place in the preparation of cadres for the entire local defense system. According to *Za Oboronu* (For Defense),* special attention is given to the chiefs of city and rayon MPVO units by means of courses supervised from the republic level of MPVO organization. In this training the experience of specialists who have worked under combat conditions is utilized. Upon completion of training, the chief MPVO officers should be able not only to lead their MPVO organizations but also to organize them and to direct the training of the units under their control.

6. In addition to their regular study programs the MPVO officers are required to improve their general education and to become familiar with the economic, geographic, and climatic peculiarities of their region, including

* *Za Oboronu* is a bi-weekly publication, apparently discontinued in 1948, of the Central Council of the Union of OSOAVIAKhIM of the USSR and the Main Administration of Local Anti-Air Defense of the MVD, which was largely devoted to civil defense.

the plans for its development under the five-year plans. This broad knowledge prepares them to integrate civil defense preparations with the development of municipal economies, transportation, and industrial planning.

7. City- or rayon-wide MPVO instruction is conducted under a chief supervisor, who is the officer responsible for all MPVO education in his area. Under him are senior intermediary personnel and intermediary personnel. The senior intermediaries instruct the intermediaries who are then detailed to staffs, crews, services, and institutions, to carry on training at a lower echelon.

8. Staff and field exercises are an integral part of MPVO training. These exercises, which simulate actual conditions first with maps and then on actual terrain, help to perfect the MPVO officer's skill in handling the personnel and facilities of the local civil defense organization. Critiques of these exercises are employed to note the accomplishments and shortcomings of the training and to indicate remedial measures.

9. There were reportedly in 1948 some 1,060,000 local civil defense sections under the supervision of the Main Administration of Local Anti-Air Defense (GUMPVO). Since Soviet literature has set the peacetime size of a training group variously at 15, 18, or 20 persons, the size of the civil defense organization in training at that time, if it were at full strength (which it probably was not), would have ranged from 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 people. However, 5,000,000 people reportedly received civil defense training in 1948. If the program has continued on this scale, at least as many as 20,000,000 people may now have received or be receiving civil defense training under MPVO auspices since the war. Many of these people probably also receive training from other groups discussed below.

10. *Civil Defense Training Standards.* Civil defense training to prepare persons for participation in MPVO activities is built around a set of training norms called Anti-Air-and-Chemical Defense (PVKhO). PVKhO requirements can be met through organized study groups, such as those of DOSAAF, or through self-study. Examinations can be con-

ducted by DOSAAF personnel or by personnel of other agencies coordinated through MPVO, depending upon the type of activity and by whom the candidates have been trained. Persons meeting the PVKhO requirements receive certificates and are eligible for inclusion in MPVO crews or for further specialized training for more skilled MPVO work.

11. PVKhO examinations require general knowledge of civil defense problems, including types of attacks likely to occur, identification of gases, recognition of civil defense alarms, signals, and symbols, and the general roles of MPVO services. In anti-chemical defense the candidate must understand the mechanism and use of gas masks, the structure of gas-proof shelters, how to react in contaminated areas, and the elements of decontamination. In medical-sanitary defense he must be able to recognize symptoms and provide first aid, including artificial respiration, hemorrhage control, and transfer of injured. He must also show knowledge of fire-control measures, incendiary bombs, and use of fire extinguishers.

12. There is also a GSO (Ready for Medical-Sanitary Defense) training standard which serves as the basis for the training of lay medical personnel functioning as part of or along with the Red Cross or the MPVO medical services. A junior version of this standard, the BGSO, is employed for Komsomols (Communist Union of Youth), Pioneers, and other youth organizations. During World War II reportedly 23,000,000 people fulfilled GSO standards.

13. *DOSAAF Training.* The Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF) is a mass organization whose principal purposes are to acquaint the population with the various fields of modern warfare, to provide civilians with pre-military instructions, and to strengthen the defenses of the country by extensive organizations of public opinion behind the defense program. Historically DOSAAF has grown out of the former Union of Societies for Assistance to the Defense and to Aviation and Chemical Construction of the USSR (OSOAVIAKhIM) which, according to Soviet statistics, provided during the last war for the instruction of 98,000,000

persons in passive anti-air defense. Mass civil defense training in the USSR probably goes back as far as 1927, when OSOAVIAKhIM was first organized. OSOAVIAKhIM was reorganized after the war into three new societies: The Voluntary Societies for Assistance to the Army, Navy, and Aviation (DOSARM, DOSFLOT, and DOSAV, respectively). Since the last reorganization, large increases in membership have been announced. DOSAAF receives important support from the Communist Party, especially the Communist Union of Youth (Komsomol), the sports societies, and the trade unions, whose members are often obliged to participate in DOSAAF activities.

14. It is estimated that about 16,000,000 people participate in the activities of DOSAAF. Although DOSAAF is concerned primarily with pre-military training and other activities which supplement the armed forces, it is also concerned with training for and propagandizing civil defense preparations to prepare the population for action during air raids.*

15. Primary DOSAAF organizations are formed in factories, institutions, collective and state farms, machine tractor stations, and schools. The primary groups affiliate themselves with the city or rayon, oblast, and republic societies. Membership is open to citizens between the ages of about 15 and 60. Material provision, including equipment, for training in city or rayon groups is the responsibility of the city or rayon Soviet (council). Groups in enterprises and institutions are supported by the ministry or administration of which they are a part.

16. *DOSAAF Radio Clubs.* A civil defense role is also apparently assigned to the numerous radio clubs which are subsidiary to DOSAAF. Most of their activities have been conducted in conjunction with that part of the organization which was formerly DOSARM. The activities of the radio clubs have increased greatly since the war and are currently expanding. This expansion probably reflects, at least in part, Soviet recognition of the contri-

bution which a large body of persons familiar with radio techniques can make to national defense, including civil defense. In an area under attack, especially in the case of the failure of the telephone system, portable radio communication would be almost indispensable. Widely scattered amateur radio operators could also form an important link in the aircraft warning system and, in time of emergency, might be employed to relieve the overloaded normal communication networks.

17. *Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (SOKKIKP).* A major civil defense role is also played by the Volunteer Societies of the Red Cross, or the Red Crescent in Moslem areas, whose medical, sanitary, and first aid activities affect large masses of the population. Their functions include not only a well-developed system of training but also forming and managing groups which perform particular tasks connected with public health and with sanitary and first aid aspects of military and civil defense operation.

18. The Societies of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent had an estimated membership of over 15,000,000 in 1948 (comparable to their highest enrollment in World War II). As in the case of DOSAAF, primary units (250,000 in 1946) are found throughout the country in such locations as factories, collective farms, and schools. The primary units are controlled by committees on the rayon level which in turn are under the jurisdiction of city or oblast committees. Central control of the SOKKIKP is assured by its further organization up through Union-Republic and All-Union Committees.

19. The wide dispersion of the primary units of the SOKKIKP enhances their effectiveness in many functions concerned with public health and civil defense. The Societies' primary units assist the civil and military health authorities in such programs as inoculation against diseases, better sanitation and hygiene, and the collection of blood donations. Also, the primary units comprise first aid stations and teams trained in decontamination procedures and in the care and evacuation of the injured in time of disaster. As partially trained groups, the primary units form a con-

* *Patriot Rodiny*, a bi-weekly newspaper published by DOSAAF, which may have replaced *Za Oboronu*, contains details of DOSAAF civil defense training.

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venient and important part of the Medical-Sanitary Service of the MPVO system.

20. To maintain its own operating units and to increase interest in and knowledge of medical and sanitary measures among the population, the SOKKIKP conducts a large and effective mass education program. Persons satisfying GSO (Ready for Medical-Sanitary Defense) standards become qualified to serve in various types of units under the SOKKIKP

and in the civil defense system of the MPVO. The MPVO must then further train such persons and the units to which they belong to function efficiently within the civil defense system. While medical and sanitation training is also conducted by the Ministries of Health and by DOSAAF, the Societies of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent are the most important source of mass medical and sanitary assistance in time of emergency.

T O P S E C R E T

APPENDIX "C"

PREPARATION AGAINST SPECIAL WEAPONS ATTACKS

1. *Defense against Atomic Attack.* It is not clear from available evidence that the USSR is making any specific preparations for civil defense against atomic weapons. There is no visible attempt to improve shelter areas and other facilities specifically for atomic defense purposes. On the other hand, there have been unconfirmed reports of construction and renovation of underground installations, and investigation of the capacity of tunnels to withstand explosion. Moreover, there are various indications that preparations are underway which contribute indirectly to Soviet capabilities for meeting such attacks. Most of the emergencies contemplated in Soviet civil defense planning are those resulting from air raids, and the preparations being made would be of use in both atomic and conventional attacks. It is probable that the USSR is preparing for atomic defense in its broader civil defense measures. For example, preparations for civil defense against chemical warfare are to some degree adaptable to atomic attack, particularly the medical and decontamination facilities. All Soviet internal propaganda constantly reiterates statements minimizing the effects of atomic attack and there is apparently little popular anxiety over the consequences of atomic bombing. One motive for such minimizing might be to reduce the possibility of panic immediately preceding or during atomic attacks.

2. *Defense against Chemical Attack.* It is known that from 1927 through the immediate post-World War II period, OSOAVIAKhIM widely disseminated information regarding defense against chemical attack. The training program for defense against chemical and air attack thoroughly covered the various elements of civil defense against chemical warfare. Despite the subsequent reorganizations of OSOAVIAKhIM and its successors, the same program has probably been retained. At least 15½ million Soviet citizens, including medical and other specialized personnel, prin-

cipally in urban areas, have been trained at some time since World War II in chemical warfare defense. This group, with a minimum of retraining, would provide an effective nucleus for the extension of civilian chemical warfare defense training in the USSR.

3. Soviet military chemical defense equipment is believed to be adequate; it is conventional in quality and design. It is not known, however, to what extent Soviet civil organizations have been supplied with this equipment, either for training or for use in case of attack.

4. *Defense against Biological Attack.* The well-developed Soviet research and development activities and experience in control of natural diseases of man, livestock, or crops create an existing capability for defense against biological warfare (BW) attack of many kinds, since diseases resulting from BW are likely to differ only in degree, not in type, from those of natural origin. This capability is increased by the availability of professional and nonprofessional personnel and by the apparent linking of a reported Anti-Epidemic Service in the Ministry of Health with local civil defense plans. Although there is no convincing evidence that Soviet efforts to improve their control over human, plant, and animal diseases have been affected either in intensity or direction by fear of BW, it seems likely that their fight against diseases of whatever origin must have been stimulated and accelerated by their notorious fear of sabotage.

5. Although the USSR has made propaganda claims that the Western Powers are using BW in Korea, there are no specific indications that specific BW defense training is currently underway. The USSR may be relying upon its regular medical, veterinary, and phytopathological services as sufficient to care for any BW emergency. Moreover, Soviet civil defense preparations for defense against chemical warfare also are somewhat adaptable to biological attack, especially the medical and decontamination facilities.

APPENDIX "D"

OTHER ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCES BEARING ON CIVIL DEFENSE

1. The ultimate effectiveness of Soviet civil defenses in an emergency will largely depend upon the capabilities or limitations of the resources at their disposal. These resources include the regular public service agencies, such as health, transportation, firefighting, police, communications, construction, and others. The effectiveness of Soviet civil defense operations will also be governed by the country's economic production capacity, which will limit the supply of equipment or emergency reserves. Other limitations are imposed by geography and population distribution and by the extent to which civil defense needs are taken into account in city, regional, or industrial construction planning. All of the above factors are apparently taken into account in the Soviet civil defense program, and plans for the integrated use of all available resources in event of emergency undoubtedly exist.

2. *Police and Firefighting Resources.* The highly developed police services under the Ministry of State Security (MGB) form an efficient military organization, whose uniformed police are normally responsible for law en-

forcement, regulation of order and public safety, and protection of public and private property. In an emergency, these forces would have extensive capabilities for enforcing laws, maintaining order, and warning the population. The firefighting system, like the MPVO, is part of the MVD. Although proper equipment is often lacking, the system is well-organized. The fact that both firefighting and MPVO are part of the same administrative network provides for close coordination of the two activities.

3. *Medical Resources.* The large and complex facilities of the Ministry of Health, which controls all aspects of medicine and sanitation in the USSR, are closely integrated with the MPVO system. Although the quality of its hospitals, drug supplies, and medical personnel are inadequate and sometimes even primitive by US standards, the Ministry of Health has expanded remarkably in recent years, primarily in quantity of personnel and facilities. While these facilities vary from one locality to another, the USSR is by no means impoverished of medical facilities, as can be seen by comparison of numbers of hospital beds in the USSR with those in the US:

Number of Hospital Beds Available			
Country & Population	Year	Non-Psychiatric	Psychiatric
USSR (est. 1947 population about 193 million)	1941	661,431 beds	100,000 beds
	1950	887,500 beds (est.)	
US (1950 population about 151 million)	1948	732,021 beds	691,499 beds

In addition, in recent years schoolhouses suitable for emergency conversion to hospitals have been built in locations which fit civil defense planning. Improvement of ambulance services also has been stressed. Although the USSR is short of well-qualified M.D.'s, it has many subprofessional medical personnel (feldshers) who are trained to perform elementary diagnosis and treatment and minor surgery.

4. Most pharmaceuticals are kept in central supply depots and distribution is controlled

centrally. In case of war, priorities in favor of military needs would probably lessen reserves available for civilian defense purposes to such an extent as to make certain drugs unobtainable. Increasing production, however, indicates a more favorable pharmaceutical situation by 1954. With respect to blood plasma and blood substitutes, although no stockpiling is evident, the USSR is known, from its World War II experience, to have a large capacity for obtaining and processing and distributing whole blood.

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5. *Transportation Resources.* In recent years, attempts have been made to improve the Soviet vehicular facilities, in quality as well as quantity. Motorcycles and trucks have reportedly been made available to MPVO and DOSAAF, although to what extent the supply meets the needs is not known. Aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR has, on occasion, been withdrawn from commercial service to meet emergency needs and could form a part of civil defense transportation. Specialized medical aviation services are currently operated by some units of the Civil Air Fleet to fly medical personnel and supplies to remote areas and to transport patients to hospitals by ambulance plane.

6. *Stockpiling.* In postwar years, the USSR has undertaken an extensive stockpiling program, with special attention to the construction of storage and maintenance facilities, including underground space. Although no stockpiles have been identified as being specifically set aside for civil defense purposes, the following items of importance to civil defense needs are known to be subject to reserve: fuels, tools, air defense and sanitary equipment, chemical equipment, automotive equipment, communications equipment, illuminating and signal supplies, rope, anti-friction compounds, heat insulation materials, asphalt, cement, etc. There are indications of static reserves of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies.

7. *Protective Construction.* Present shelter facilities in the USSR consist primarily of those which remain from World War II. The audible warning systems and designations of shelter areas in large cities have not been removed, but there is no evidence that these facilities are being renovated or prepared for use. There are numerous reports, however, of provision for shelter facilities in new construction. Dwelling construction specifications in some areas, such as Stalingrad, include provision for shelters. Some new shelter areas are also being provided by new structures and in-

stallations which can be used as auxiliary air raid shelters or which have been constructed with that as a secondary purpose. Auxiliary shelters include subways, railroad and other tunnels, mines, cement bunkers, aqueducts and sewer pipes, cellars, and bridge abutments. Tunnels dug recently in Moscow for subway expansion and for other vehicular traffic were probably built with civil defense needs in mind. Special bombproof and gas-proof shelters reportedly exist for use of key government officials in Moscow.

8. Evidently civil defense needs are taken into account in much of the new construction in the USSR. Construction agencies maintain close liaison with military organizations by regularly retaining defense specialists (probably members of MPVO). The duty of these specialists is to monitor construction plans from the point of view of defense. Monitoring consists of preventing, where possible, the concentration of industrial plants and railway facilities. In the planning of schools, the defense specialist considers their possible use as emergency hospitals or barracks. He also tries to insure the location of hospitals at the edges of towns.

9. Civil defense needs are probably also taken into account in Soviet long range urban and regional planning. The development of agreements between regions for mutual aid and sharing of equipment in event of emergency is apparently contemplated. Unconfirmed reports also indicate the existence of a plan for the emergency decentralization of Soviet administration into regional subsections. In the event of the loss of communication with the central government, these subsections could carry on all necessary central direction of the area. The focal points of these subsections are probably the Union-Republic Councils of Ministers and other existing local governments. In an emergency these bodies would reportedly assume authority over war industry and supply centers in their areas.



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ESTIMATES IN "ORIS"
= ESTIMATES - VIEW/OBTAIN FROM NARA
+ = PG. COUNT CONFIRMED
(SAN) = SANITIZED